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Article 3

Impunity: Elements for an Empirical
Concept
Jorge E. Vifiuales*
This Article attempts to set the basis for a new approach to
the concept of impunity. Drawing upon the experience of the
author as launcher and director of a project to develop a
quantitative concept of impunity for the Swiss Section of Amnesty
International, this piece discusses the main difficulties, both
methodological and substantial, as well as the advantages that an
empirical conceptualization of impunity could have. In the last
section, the author puts forward a proposal aimed at developing an
international impunity index that would help monitor and
compare the impunity phenomenon across countries.

What is time?... We surely know what we mean when we
speak of it. We also know what is meant when we hear
someone else talking about it. What then is time? Provided
that no one asks me, I know.'

Introduction
Augustine's famous dictum could easily be applied to the less
mystic, though not less mysterious, question of what is impunity.
The number of reports, declarations, speeches, and legislative acts
2
using the term impunity has skyrocketed in the last few decades.
Everybody is against impunity, provided they know what it is. In
an interesting article focusing on the definition of impunity, a

* LL.M. (Harvard Law School), D.E.A. in International Law (Graduate
Institute of International Studies, Geneva), Lic. iur (University of Fribourg);
Former Head of the Measuring Impunity Initiative, Amnesty International,
Swiss Section. The views expressed in this article are personal and do not
necessarily reflect those of Amnesty International. I am grateful to the Swiss
National Science Foundation for providing funding for this research. Send
comments to: jorgevin@hotmail.com.
1. SAINT AUGUSTINE CONFESSIONS 230 (Henry Chadwick trans.,Oxford Univ.
Press) (1991).
2. See, e.g., Mary Margaret Penrose, Impunity - Inertia, Inaction, and
Invalidity, 17 B.U. INT'L L.J. 269, 273 (1999) (comparing definitions of impunity).
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young scholar noted: "Impunity, much like accountability, is a
term with a distinct legal meaning. Yet it is rare to find either
phrase adequately defined in a particular work. Rather, these
terms have become so ubiquitous that their respective meanings
are deemed obvious." 3 She then explored a number of useful
characterizations of the term impunity, such as those of Cherif
Bassiouni, Christopher Joyner, Charles Harper, Louis Joinet, and
Amnesty International, among others. 4 These characterizations
all join in their attempt to spell out, to de-condense the myriad
implications that the term impunity both hides and suggests. This
article is premised on the idea that in doing so, each interpreter
tends to emphasize one or more situations that could be referred to
as impunity, the reasons for this particular emphasis seldom being
explicit.
The most authoritative characterization of the term impunity
so far is probably the one given by Louis Joinet, the U.N. Special
Rapporteur on the question of the impunity of perpetrators of
violations of human rights. 5 As it will be shown, Joinet's
characterization underwent significant changes over time, which
can be organized around two axes. 6 The first axis concerns the
relationship between impunity and punishment. The fluctuations
on this front can be retraced by reading the definitions of impunity
given in consecutive U.N. reports. 7 In his 1996 Report to the SubCommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
3. Id. at 273.
4. Id. at 274-76 (citing U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Sub-Comm. on Prevention
of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, Question of the Impunity of Perpetratorsof
Violations of Human Rights (Civil and Political Rights), U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/18 (June 29, 1996) (prepared by Louis Joinet)) [hereinafter
ECOSOC (June 29, 1996)]; Amnesty Int'l, Disappearancesand Political Killings:
Human Rights Crises of the 1990"s, AI Index ACT 33/01/94, Jan. 1, 1994; Charles
Harper, From Impunity to Reconciliation, in IMPUNITY: AN ETHICAL PERSPECTIVE
viii, ix (Charles Harper ed., 1996); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Searching for Peace and
Achieving Justice, Autumn LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 18 (1996); Christopher C.
Joyner, Redressing Impunity for Human Rights Violations, 26 DENV. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 591, 595-96 (1998).
5. ECOSOC (June 29, 1996), supranote 4, at 9.
6. The reports do not use this categorization; however, I think it is helpful to
present the major developments that occurred over time.
7. ECOSOC (June 29, 1996), supra note 4, at 9; U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council,
Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, Question of the
Impunity of Perpetratorsof Violations of Human Rights (Civil and Political):Final
Report 15-16, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20 (June 26, 1997) (prepared by Louis
Joinet) [hereinafter ECOSOC (June 26, 1997)], U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council
[ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities,
Question of the Impunity of Perpetratorsof Violations of Human Rights (Civil and
Political): Revised Final Report 17, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev.1 (Oct. 2,
1997) (preparedby Louis Joinet) [hereinafter ECOSOC (Oct. 2, 1997)].
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Minorities, 8 Mr. Joinet introduced the following concept of
impunity: "Impunity means the impossibility, de jure or de facto,
of bringing the perpetrators of human rights violations to account
- whether
in criminal, civil, administrative or disciplinary
proceedings - since they are not subject to any inquiry that might
lead to them being accused, arrested, tried and, if found guilty,
convicted." 9 The following year, the definition was amended by
the incorporation, immediately after the word "convicted," of the
phrase "and to reparations being made to their victims."'10 That
same year this definition was further amended as follows: "[A]nd,
if found guilty, sentenced to appropriate penalties, and to making
reparations to their victims."'"
These changes reflect the
underlying idea that impunity cannot be addressed if the victims
do not receive adequate reparation; however, while this is
certainly a desirable objective, it is not an obvious addition. More
precisely, it is not obvious whether punishment without
compensation or compensation without punishment constitutes
"impunity."' 2 In this respect, the Rapporteur took a clear stance,
thereby introducing an ideological element into his definition of
impunity.
The ideological component of any attempt to spell out the
concept of impunity is even more apparent from the perspective of
the second axis, which refers to the type of human right that has
been violated. After the presentation of preliminary reports on the
question, the Sub-Commission adopted resolution 1993/37,
requesting that the study cover not only breaches to civil and
political rights, but also grave violations to economic, social, and
cultural rights. 13
This openness to an area as difficult to

8. Subsequently named Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Sub-Comm. on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights, Annotations to the Provisional Agenda 1, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/I/Add. 1 (June 23, 2000).
9. ECOSOC (June 29, 1996), supranote 4, at 9.
10. ECOSOC (June 26, 1997), supra note 7, at 15-16.
11. ECOSOC (Oct. 2, 1997), supra note 7, at 17.
12. One could recall, for instance, the transitional process in South Africa.
There, despite substantial efforts to create and implement an accountability
method (the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, with power to grant or deny
individual amnesties), in practice reparations did not seem to be in the
government's agenda. The question is whether one should consider the efforts
undertaken to ensure accountability sufficient to exclude the term impunity or
insufficient because of the inadequate progress regarding reparations.
13. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination
& Prot. of Minorities, Question of the Impunity of Perpetratorsof Violations of
Human Rights 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2JRes/1993/37 (Aug. 26, 1993) [hereinafter
ECOSOC (Aug. 26, 1993)] ("Decides, having regard to the interdependence and
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circumscribe as economic, social, and cultural rights was, no
doubt, a huge burden for the Special Rapporteur, Mr. El Hadji
Guiss6, who clearly was aware of the many controversies affecting
the actual enforceability of these rights. 14 His report provided the
following characterization:
Impunity can be understood as the absence or inadequacy of
penalties and/or compensation for massive and grave

violations of the human rights of individuals or groups of

individuals. This definition is applicable to civil and political
rights, as well as economic, social15and cultural rights, and also

to collective or communal rights.
This definition, like the more precise one presented in Mr.
Joinet's Report, leaves substantial room for different and possibly
conflicting interpretations. More importantly, it is not clear who
should be held responsible for apparent possible violations such as
an inadequate supply of water or the ramifications of an
excessively heavy debt burden. In this context of vagueness and
controversy, it could be useful to look for a more empirical basis to
help bridge the gap between the concept of impunity and its actual
uses.
Many organizations have been actively involved in detecting
and fighting impunity in practice. 16 The efforts of Amnesty
International ("AT") in this area are noteworthy. While Al has its
own way to flesh out the contents of the term impunity, 17 such
indivisibility of civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights, to
request the Special Rapporteurs to continue their study on the second aspect of the
question, concerning economic, social and cultural rights.").
14. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination
& Prot. of Minorities, FinalReport on the Question of the Impunity of Perpetrators
of Violations of Human Rights (Economic, Social and CulturalRights) 5, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/8 (June 27, 1997) (prepared by El Hadji Guiss6) [hereinafter
ECOSOC (June 27, 1997)] ("This document, based on the latter two reports
mentioned above, thus constitutes the final report on the impunity of perpetrators
of violations of economic, social and cultural rights - a final report in which very
many questions of great importance are nevertheless raised.").
15. See id. 20.
16. To name but a few of them: Human Rights Watch, Transparency
International, TRIAL (Track Impunity Always).
17. Al seems to link the concept of impunity to that of international crimes. A
possible current statement of such policy can be found in the Brussels Principles
Against Impunity and for International Justice elaborated during a Conference
organized jointly by AI-Belgium and other organizations in March 2002. See COAL.
FOR THE INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, BRUSSELS GROUP FOR INT'L JUSTICE, BRUSSELS
PRINCIPLES
AGAINST
IMPUNITY AND
FOR
INT'L JUSTICE
3
(2002),
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=country&iduct=17
(last visited Sept. 15, 2006)
("'Impunity' is understood as failing to investigate, prosecute and try natural and
legal persons guilty of serious violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law. For the purpose of these Principles 'serious violations of human
rights and international humanitarian law' mean in particular war crimes, crimes
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contents may lose pace with actual practice. This piece is an
attempt to tie the concept of impunity to its practice, as reflected
by AI's efforts in this area. I will discuss the main elements of
what would be an empirical concept of impunity, one that would be
based on the practice of a number of authoritative organizations
and whose conceptual expression would be constantly updated
through the use of a quantitative index of impunity.
Throughout 2005, I had the opportunity to initiate and
conduct a project for the Swiss section of AI aimed precisely at
identifying a measurable concept of impunity.18 The project was
an exploratory study undertaken by a group of volunteer members
of AI Switzerland. In what follows, I would like to present my
personal views regarding some of the results this research yielded.
For confidentiality reasons, I have removed every piece of AI's
internal information and asked for Al's authorization before
submitting this piece. As part of this authorization, I must note
that the study and its findings do not necessarily reflect current or
future AI policy and/or practice and that AI does not necessarily
agree with them. The data discussed is, moreover, strictly limited
to that publicly accessible on AI's online library, and with this
comes all the methodological implications that such an approach
may have.
These results are worth sharing for five main reasons. First,
the concept of impunity derived from this project is not merely the
result of introspection. The team considered more than 3,000 AI
public documents of which more than 1,000 were reports, selecting
a representative sample of ninety-eight reports from this narrower
Second, the authoritative
pool to then analyze in detail.19
character of Al's research in the field and its wide use as a source

against humanity, genocide, torture, extrajudicial executions and forced
disappearances ....).
18. The project involved thirteen young scholars and professionals to whom I
am indebted, particularly Ms. Sina Zintzmeyer, who was the co-author of the final
report, as well as to Marko Bandler, who designed the methodology to select the
sample. The other participants were E. Alvarez, M.-L. Andr6, D. Carnal, C.
Cosenza, S. Dubach, V. Druz, M. Lecerf, F. Messina, I. Ovando, D. Schmidiger, and
D. Yared.
19. Initially, the project entailed analyzing more than 1,000 reports instead of a
representative sample, but for a number of organizational and time constraints,
this could not be done. The number of reports available at AI's online library on
the theme "impunity" changes regularly. See AI library archive for "impunity"
As of October 10, 2006,
results, http://web.amnesty.org/library/eng-325/index.
there were 3,366 documents under this heading, of which 1,542 are reports. At the
time the team undertook the research (the second half of 2004), the number was
lower (approximately 3,000 documents, with roughly 1,000 reports). For further
detail, see the description of the methodology followed in Appendix 1.
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by external observers and analysts draw attention to the way AI
envisions the concept of impunity in its everyday research and
monitoring practice.20
Third, as will be shown, the analysis
conducted highlighted areas of the concept of impunity that
appear to be relatively neglected. 21 The existence of such gray
areas seems to be particularly important, considering that
visibility is a necessary preliminary step for any attempt to
counter impunity effectively. Fourth, the experience of trying to
grasp this concept in a more empirical way suggested that much
could be gained from building a quantitative concept of impunity.
Indeed, despite the inherent difficulty of the task, I think that
such a concept can be built without disqualifying losses in terms of
flexibility, objectiveness, or overall relevance.
Finally, an
empirical concept of impunity could serve as the dependent
variable of future regression models seeking to explain impunity.
Such models would represent an invaluable tool to support
qualitative approaches to the fight against impunity, such as the
2
ones proposed by the U.N. Special Rapporteurs or that of AI. 2
It is important to note that, for the most part, the analysis
assumes that the work of AI is a reasonable indicator of what the
term impunity covers in practice. This assumption can be seen as
either controversial or preliminary. It can first be considered
controversial given the obvious fact that, from a methodological
point of view, one cannot expect to derive a general empirical
concept of impunity from the work of a single organization, no
matter how important or influential this organization may be.
Nonetheless, I prefer to approach this assumption as a
preliminary one in two main respects. First, as stated in the title,
the analysis only aims at providing some elements towards an
empirical concept of impunity. For this reason, I have been
cautious to use the conditional mode in virtually all the assertions
made throughout this piece. Second, and more generally, I think
that in trying to distill an empirical concept of impunity, Al's work
23
is a reasonable place to start.

20. See, e.g., ABRAM CHAYES
SOVEREIGNTY:

COMPLIANCE

& ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW

WITH INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

162-66

(1995)

(noting the importance of non-governmental organizations in general, and AI's
yearbook in particular, in monitoring and reporting human rights abuses, and the
UN's near-total reliance on such reports).
21. See supra notes 3-17 and accompanying text.
22. See id.
23. AI's documentation is an important primary source for the study of human
rights violations as a whole. This is largely due to both its rigorous information
gathering and analysis standards and its strong commitment to make this
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I begin with a review of the procedure followed to derive a
broad empirical concept of impunity before turning to the ways in
which this concept could be used to organize the understanding of
this phenomenon. The piece ends with a proposal to develop a
quantitative index of impunity that could be used to comparatively
assess the levels of impunity across countries.
I. An Empirical Concept of Impunity: Where to Start?
Impunity is a vague term. Its vagueness resides in the subtle
tension between what it suggests and what it hides. For instance,
while it is quite obvious that a pardon given to a torturer would be
perceived as impunity by most observers, such a perception would
be much more ambiguous when the term impunity is used to
describe "crimes against creation or letting jobs be cut for
thousands of men and women because they are not competitive in
the Free Market."24 These two cases reflect the tension inherent
in most attempts to spell out the idea of impunity, which are, quite
naturally, value-laden.
Ambiguity pervades the use of the term impunity and may
arise even in cases where it would seem fully appropriate.
Suppose that a military officer receives the order to torture a
terrorist in order to get information as to the location of a bomb
about to blow up in one of the city's schools. Suppose further that
this officer executes the order and that the information obtained
turns out to be critical in saving the lives of hundreds of children.
Should such an officer be punished, and, if yes, to what extent?
Should the hypothetical terrorist or his/her family be
compensated? Does this fact pattern involve impunity? This
example, 25 which sadly enough may not be the result of pure
information easily available.
Moreover, AI's broad focus on human rights
violations of different sorts reduces, to a considerable extent, the existence of prior
biases in the issues covered. Furthermore, AI has played a major role in shaping
human rights norms, including the fight against impunity. For further detail on
AI's internal practices and influence see generally ANN MARIE CLARK, DIPLOMACY
OF CONSCIENCE: AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL AND CHANGING HuMAN RIGHTS NORMS
(2001); STEPHEN HOPGOOD, KEEPERS OF THE FLAME: UNDERSTANDING AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL (2006).

24. Raul Soza, The Church: A Witness to the Truth on the Way to Freedom, in
IMPUNITY: AN ETHICAL PERSPECTIVE 60,

66 (Charles Harper ed., 1996).

Soza's

position is, of course, especially controversial. This is in fact what it makes it an
illuminating example of the extent to which the term impunity may be ideologically
loaded.
While one may think this use of the term impunity is extremely
controversial, it is not as far from the mainstream characterization as one may
think. See, e.g., ECOSOC (June 26, 1997), supra note 7, at Annex II, Section II.A.
25. It must be clear that this example does not reflect Al's policy on this issue.
See
Amnesty
Int'l,
Torture
and ill-treatment: the arguments, at
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conjecture, poses a dilemma. The circumstances surrounding the
case perhaps would attenuate the reaction both from politicians
and the public opinion in the country; however, the prohibition of
torture is widely recognized as absolute, as a prohibition that a
Similar
country cannot derogate under any circumstance. 26
tensions also may arise in less ambiguous cases. Some pedjle in
Latin America may feel that crimes committed by the Chilean or
Argentine dictatorships were "worth" the cause of fighting
communist subversion. 27 For such people, the term impunity as
applied to Pinochet or Videla would make little sense. 28 On the
other hand, a large portion of international public opinion and
virtually all non-governmental organizations ("NGOs") active in
the fight against impunity welcomed the Pinochet affair and its
29
multiplier effect.

(last visited Sept. 14,
http://web.amnesty.org/pages/stoptorture-arguments-eng
2006), for a detailed statement of Al's policy on the issue of torture.
26. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A (XXI), art. 4.2, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/2890 (Dec.
16, 1966) (excluding torture from the articles that a State Party may derogate in
times of emergency); Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 15, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, 232 [hereinafter
ECHR] (commonly referred to as the European Convention on Human Rights)
(same); Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights
art. 27, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ACHR]
(same); Arab Charter on Human Rights art. 4, Sept. 15, 1994, translated in 18
HUM. RTS. L.J. 151, 152 (1997) (not in force) (same). The existence of a hierarchy
has been asserted several times by the International Court of Justice. See
FREDERIC SUDRE, DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET EUROPItEN DES DROITS DE L'HOMME

59-64 (3d ed. 1997), for examples of that court's decisions and advisory opinions.
27. But see Amnesty Int'l, supra note 25, at Questions 3-4 (challenging the
argument that torture is justified when dealing with suspected terrorists).
28. The views of some sectors of the population regarding the role played by the
dictatorships in Chile and Argentina in a historical context characterized by
terrorist action from communist guerrillas are less settled than what a foreign
observer may tend to conclude. Hesitations as to how to assess the crimes
committed during the two dictatorships is only occassionally visible. One could for
instance refer to the public protest of certain sectors of the population when
Pinochet was under arrest in London., See Jacques Secretan, Le Sort de Pinochet
Divise l'Opinion, in PINOCHET FACE A LA JUSTICE ESPAGNOLE 7ff (Paz Rojas B.,
Victor Espinoza C., Julia Urquieta 0., Herndn Soto H. eds, 1999).
29. See NAOMI ROHT-ARRIAZA, THE PINOCHET EFFECT: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
IN THE AGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 170 (2005). The idea of a "multiplier effect," in
reference to the Keynesian multiplier, simply means that after the Pinochet affair
many other cases were brought to court in different countries on the basis of
universal jurisdiction. See generally MITSUE INAZUMI, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN
MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW: EXPANSION OF NATIONAL JURISDICTION FOR
PROSECUTING SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAw (2005) (tracing the

development of universal jurisdiction and compiling guidelines for its use); LUC
REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES (Ian Brownlie & Vaughan Lowe eds., 2003) (constructing a

framework for the exercise of universal jurisdiction and examining how several
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This brief discussion is only intended to suggest that what
More
the term "impunity" conveys is far from obvious.
importantly, introspective attempts at spelling it out may, at
times, be too ideologically biased to serve as a definitive basis for
conceptualizing impunity. In this context, a useful complementary
approach could consist of analyzing a large amount of cases that
have been characterized in part or in whole as impunity cases
while trying to derive, through aggregation and condensation, a
more empirically based concept of impunity. The pool from which
such cases are picked would have to be as large and objective as
possible, covering most of the "legitimate" or "appropriate" uses of
the term impunity. 30 In this regard, using the impressive amount
of information gathered by Al appeared as a reasonable starting
31
point.
For the project, the team selected a representative sample of
ninety-eight reports out of a pool of more than 3,000 documents,
including 1,000 reports, catalogued under the heading of
"Impunity" in AI's public online library. 32 These reports were
analyzed first by region 33 to see if the underlying concept guiding
Al's research and advocacy differed at the regional level. Such
differences would have stemmed, for instance, from the specific
cultural, social, and political conditions of the countries in each of
these regions. 34 Overall, a single concept of impunity could be
countries exercise such jurisdiction); JURIDICTIONS NATIONALES ET CRIMES
INTERNATIONAUX, (Antonio Cassese & Mireille Delmas-Marty eds., 2002)
(discussing the development and use of universal jurisdiction).
30. By "legitimate" or "appropriate" uses of the term impunity, I simply mean
The underlying
those uses that are more accepted or less controversial.
assumption is that it is possible to draw a representative inventory of how most
people would use the term impunity. Such an approach has been widely popular in
the areas of legal and political philosophy and can be traced at least as far as the
works of Aristotle. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics bk. V, in THE
COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1729, 1781-97 (Jonathan Barnes ed., W.D. Ross
trans., J.O. Urmson rev. trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1984) (defining what is just
and unjust on the basis of an analyis of how wors such as justice, just, and unjust
are used in practice).
31. Admittedly, one cannot expect such raw materials to be either
comprehensive or fully objective. A possibility for enhancing these materials would
be to bring in cases reported by other NGOs with enough credibility not to harm
the desired objectivity of the project.
32. See infra app. 1 (outlining the methodology).
33. The traditional approachs used by AI distinguished five main regions:
Africa, Americas, Asia-Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Middle East and North
Africa. See Regions, Amnesty International, http://web.amnesty.orgflibrary/
engworld (last visited Sept. 11, 2006), for a list of the countries covered under each
heading.
34. I am aware that assuming that such regions share a common set of
underlying features is highly controversial. For example, one may intuitively think
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distilled that is at the same time large and flexible enough to
describe the issues arising in the different regions while leaving
enough room for adjustment to particularities. This concept is
based on the intersection between two dimensions, taking into
account, respectively, the status of the author that would benefit
from impunity and the conditions that grant/maintain this state of
impunity. Thus, in practice, impunity would not be seen as a
"phrase" settling once and for all the meaning of the term
impunity, but rather as a loosely circumscribed set of practices
involving different types of actors.
The procedure for deriving such a notion involved two steps.
First, each regional group was asked to develop a limited, though
detailed, set of dimensions covering the cases it analyzed.3
Second, these dimensions were compared and put together into a
general framework, 36 which looks as follows:

Figure 1: Dimensions of Impunity

that Europe and Central Asia may be, in terms of cultural and social
characteristics, further from each other than from other regions. This choice was
made on purely operational grounds and is subject to be refined through further
research.
35. See infra app. 1 (outlining the methodology).
36. See infra app. 1 (outlining the methodology).
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37
Figure 1 displays the two-dimensional concept of impunity. 38
The first dimension concerns the causes/conditions of impunity
and is divided into structural and functional aspects. 39 The
expression structural aspects refers to all institutional and legal
measures that would need to be taken in order to increase

37. See KA AMBOS, IMPUNIDAD Y DERECHO PENAL INTERNACIONAL 34-43 (2d
ed. 1999), for a conceptual definition of impunity to some extent comparable to the
one provided here. Professor Ambos approaches the idea of impunity at three
First, he introduces a distinction between normative impunity (that
levels.
immediately derived from legislation) and factual impunity (that immediately
derived from practice). Id. at 34. Second, he distinguishes between substantial
(that related to the substance of the offenses that can be prosecuted) and
procedural impunity (that stemming from procedural hurdles). Id. at 34-35. Third,
he notes that impunity may stem from structural problems present in a particular
society. Id. at 35. There are several differences between this characterization and
the one provided in this piece. First and foremost, the methodology at the basis of
the two definitions is, as can be discerned from Professor Ambos's analysis,
completely different. While this piece attempts to identify an "empirical" concept of
impunity, as understood in the social science jargon, Professor Ambos's
characterization is apparently based on a purely qualitative methodology. Second,
there is no dimension accounting for the type of actor involved in the facts. While,
as later discussed, this may be problematic from an analytical point of view, it
remains a conspicuous feature of the way in which impunity is approached in
practice and must therefore be accounted for in any attempt to derive an
"empirical" concept of impunity. Third, even in those aspects where both notions
appear to be highly similar-in particular with respect to the distinction between
normative and factual impunity and its similarity to the distinction between
structural and functional aspects-appearances are misleading. A measure falling
under the structural aspect does not necessarily belong to what Professor Ambos
calls a normative measure. In any event, Professor Ambos's characterization
remains extremely useful to grasp the subtleties of the impunity phenomenon, in
particular those that cannot be sketched using an empirical approach.
38. The concepts of cause and condition are different. A condition may be
necessary but not sufficient to cause a particular effect. For the purpose of the
impunity framework, the first dimension involves both causes and conditions. For
instance, a widespread practice in the judicial system of not prosecuting the former
military or the authors of gender-motivated crimes could be viewed as a cause of
impunity, while the non-ratification of a treaty may only be a condition. Of course,
in the end, it all comes down to the particular impact of each condition. Thus, the
practice we have just characterized as a cause could be the result of the absence of
ratification of a particular treaty, and so on.
39. In a first version of the model, both the structural and the functional
aspects were subdivided into another two categories. These categories would
establish in each case whether the corresponding failure was caused by a lack of
political will or by a lack of capacity; however, such categorization was abandoned
since the lack of will or capacity often are dissimulated by the government, and the
analyzed reports did not provide enough material to sort out this issue.
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accountability, from the ratification of a treaty or the abrogation of
an amnesty law to the building of better penitentiary facilities or
the establishing of national legislation in fields such as human
rights or transparency. The expression functional aspects is used
to cover those cases where all institutional/legal structures are in
place but they are simply not used, whether this inertia is itself
legal or not. The idea underlying the distinction is simply that
institutional/legal measures are not enough to fight impunity.4 0
Cultural and political circumstances are as important as legal
frameworks.
The second dimension identified relates to the status of the
authors of the alleged acts. Here, the basic distinction is between
state and non-state actors. 41 It is interesting to note that impunity
tends to be linked to individuals or groups which act either as part
of the state apparatus or in close connection with it;42 however,
there is an increasing need to cover other cases involving nonstate actors, including not only rebel forces but also private
individuals who are not part of any open conflict. Indeed, as will
be illustrated in the following section, only a few reports of the
sample examined dealt with such cases. As to paramilitary
groups, they were considered state or non-state actors according to
40. See infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
41. It is worth noting that non-state actors are not limited here to private
militias or the like, as usually has been the case in qualitative attempts to define
impunity. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Hum. Rts., Sub-Comm. on
Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, Progress report on the question
of the impunity of perpetrators of violations of human rights,
6, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/18 (June 28, 1995) (prepared by Louis Joinet) [hereinafter
ECOSOC (June 28, 1995)] ("It will be recalled that a previous report
(E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/6) stated that only violations committed by the State or its
agents, or by individuals acting on their orders or with their connivance, fell within
the scope of the study. This point deserves discussion in the Subcommission in
order to see whether the study should be extended to violations committed by nonState groups, as implied in some statements made by representatives of
Governments to the Commission on Human Rights. Two arguments are advanced
in this respect: first, in a situation of civil war, the virtual absence of the State - or
its disintegration - encourages the committing of atrocities or acts of barbarity
which are not all of State origin; second, in certain armed struggles, serious crimes
and violations may be committed by non-State groups (national liberation
movements, guerrillas, etc.). The question also arises in specific terms when a
peace agreement emerges and negotiations concern, among other things, a possible
amnesty. In this light, it would be valuable to analyze the observations made by
non-governmental organizations and Governments in order to determine whether
the study should be extended to violations committed by such groups.").
42. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Hum. Rts., Sub-Comm. on Prevention
of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, Progress report on the question of the
impunity of perpetratorsof human rights violations, U.N. Doc, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/6
(July 19, 1993) (prepared by El Hadji Guisse & Louis Joinet) [hereinafter ECOSOC
(July 19, 1993)].
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whether they acted with state endorsement. 43
The two dimensions applied simultaneously yield four
possible types of scenarios. Type (A) focuses on institutional/legal
deficiencies making it difficult o;: impossible to provide some form
of accountability for crimes committed by state (or state-endorsed)
actors. In type (B), deficiencies are the result of inaction from
state officials in general. In type (C), the state fails to make nonstate actors accountable for their crimes because adequate
accountability mechanisms are lacking. For instance, one could
think of a state where gender-related abuses are not criminalized.
Type (D) also can be illustrated with this latter example; however,
in type (D) situations, while all the necessary institutional
mechanisms are in place, for cultural or political reasons they are
not implemented.
These types can be seen either as zones of higher density
within the overall notion of impunity, or, alternatively, as subconcepts of impunity, and they can serve different purposes. One
possible use would be to better understand how an organization
such as Al is balancing the focus of its impunity-related work.
Another possibility would be to help identify the root causes of
impunity in more circumscribed contexts such as a country, a
region, or a cultural area. In this piece, we will limit the inquiry
to the first of these purposes, with the explicit assumption that
such a focus can have a more general informative potential.

43. This choice is by no means evident. Some paramilitary groups or militias
operating, for instance, in Colombia or in sub-Saharan Africa are in fact enemies of
statal forces. The question arose, therefore, of whether a separate category should
be created in the framework, accounting for such a special situation. The team
decided not to treat them as a separate category for two reasons. First, they can be
dealt with adequately using the two broader categories of state and non-state
actors. Second, granting such groups a particular status would have brought us too
close to the specificities of a limited number of cases, requiring in some way that
other actors' specificities, such as those of transnational terrorist groups or even
private individuals committing gender-related offenses, be taken into consideration
as well. In other words, the choice did not seem to be between the state/non-state
and a tripartite distinction, but between the state/non-state and a multi-partite
distinction, with each category involving a different degree of generality. This
point was raised by Al staff in discussions of earlier versions of this paper. But
their suggestions, which were aimed specifically at characterizing in more detail
each non-state actor, would have thwarted the very effort of conceptualization. I do
not mean to say that conceptual distinctions cannot be made amongst different
types of non-state actors, only that any effort of conceptualization requires some
generalization. In any case, I think this question requires further reflection, and I
would be grateful for any suggestions on how to improve it.
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II. Mapping Impunity
The team then proceeded to place each report analyzed under
the most suitable of the four types. 44 Although this operation was
45
conducted according to a pre-determined set of guidelines,
differences in the way a particular report is understood and
assigned to one type or the other cannot be totally eliminated.
Despite this difficulty, the results obtained appeared clear enough
to suggest a trend:

Figure 2: A Map of Impunity4 6
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44. See infra app. 1.
45. See infra app. 1 (discussing the methodology).
46. AFR: Africa; AM: Americas; ASA: Asia-Pacific; EUR: Europe and Central
Asia; MDE: Middle East and North Africa. For a full list of reports by area see
Appendix 2.
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Figure 2 displays the distribution of the sample across types.
A visualization of the entire set of approximately 3,000 documents
dealing with impunity would, no doubt, have given a more precise
image, allowing for a more detailed analysis. Nevertheless, the
present sample offers enough grounds for comment.
The first point is that the sample overwhelmingly is
concentrated on the state actors' side of the framework.4 7 This
could be interpreted in at least three different ways. One could
first think that the sample is biased and does not reflect the actual
amount of reports focusing on non-state actors.
This is a
methodological issue that could only be definitively solved by
reviewing all the reports and documents on impunity. It therefore
goes beyond the explicit limitations of this piece. A second
interpretation would emphasize that AI's work has, by and large,
privileged a particular concept of impunity. This is a policy
question that I do not intend to address here. 48 Still a third
interpretation would seek to generalize from the practice reviewed
that non-state actors seem generally less likely to be associated
with the term impunity or, in other words, that the use of the term
impunity implies some sort of "favoritism" in the sense that it is
the very existence of ties with the state apparatus that would

47. See supra fig. 2.
48. Al staff reviewing this piece strongly emphasized that AI has a carefully
elaborated conception of impunity, which it purportedly follows. In particular, they
made it clear that the views I advance in this piece should not mislead potential
readers into thinking that AI does not have a clear conception of the meaning of
impunity. Such a conception rests, according to them, on the way international law
defines impunity. See supra note 13. It is arguable that international law clearly
characterizes what impunity means. States may be obligated to investigate and
prosecute a number of crimes considered particularly heinous and failure to do so
may result in the lack of accountability. See Stephen Macedo, Introduction in
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 1, 4 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2004); see also supra footnote
29. The difficulties involved in circumscribing the use of the term impunity in the
area of economic, social, and cultural rights provide a good illustration of how
ambiguous the purported international legal concept of impunity may be. In my
view, international law may be useful to develop a basic understanding of the rules
and standards that, if breached and left unaccounted, may lead to a widely
recognized use of the term impunity. But such a characterization is very limited.
Too much focus on these "settled" uses of the term impunity may result in
neglecting other legitimate (and historically more fundamental) fact-patterns
constituting impunity. It is by no means the task of AI to cover all uses of the term
impunity. This is a policy question, with obvious implications for any attempt to
distill a general concept of impunity from the work of a single organization.
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"favor" impunity.4 9 This latter view seems intuitively plausible.
The question is whether the term impunity should be restricted to
the activities of state (or state-endorsed) actors, thereby neglecting
non-state actors.
The second point is that type (B) situations seem to be the
most frequent. 50 Again this could be interpreted in different ways.
Aside from methodological difficulties, one might think that Al has
tended to concentrate more on implementation issues than on the
absence of institutional/legal frameworks. But, again, if one views
Al's work as a preliminary indicator of an empirical concept of
impunity, the results would suggest that impunity is a de facto
phenomenon. In other words, the concentration on type (B) would
suggest that while accountability mechanisms may be in place,
there are shortcomings in their actual use. 51 It is interesting to
note that this intuition seems compatible with an investigation
currently being conducted by Harvard Professor Beth Simmons
into the impact of international commitments to ban torture from
state practice.5 2 The study suggests that, as a rule, ratification of
the U.N. Convention Against Torture 53 does not make a state less
54
likely to use torture. It only does so in transitional democracies.
While the detailed implications of this research are yet to be
determined, overall it appears to point in the same direction as the
impunity project.
The relative importance of this de facto
impunity can be appraised better graphically.
49. ECOSOC (July 19, 1993), supra note 42.
50. See supra fig. 2.
51. The reasons underlying this phenomenon are unclear.
One obvious
possibility is the absence of political will to use the structures in place. Another
possible reason that has been advanced to explain non-compliance with
international treaties (although not only or mainly in the area of human rights) is
the actual inability of a number of States to live up to the demands involved in
ratifying an international treaty. On this "managerial" approach to compliance' see
ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY (1995);
Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, On Compliance, 48 INT'L ORG. 175, 175205 (1993); Abram Chayes et al., Managing Compliance: A Comparative
Perspective, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES 39-62 (Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K.
Jacobson eds., MIT Press 1998).
52. Beth Simmons, Untitled Investigation into Compliance with International
Human Rights Treaties (on file with Professor Simmons). The work was presented
on September 15, 2005, at an International Law Workshop at Harvard organized
by Professors William Alford and Ryan Goodman. Professor Simmons suggests
that ratification of the convention against torture only appears to have a significant
impact on states that have undergone a transition to democracy. Id. Although this
is a work in progress, it is particularly interesting because it draws largely upon
Amnesty International's data.
53. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984).
54. Simmons, supra note 52.

2007]

IMPUNITY
Figure 3: Relative Share of Each Type

C D
1% 5%

Figure 3 displays the relative percentages for each type.
Type (B) covers significantly more than one half of the cases, and
it appears to affect all areas in a roughly similar proportion:
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Figure 4: Regional Distributionof Type (B)

Figure 4 shows, for each geographical region, the number of
reports belonging to type (B) divided by the overall reports
analyzed for the respective region. These proportions are put
together to represent the relative regional distribution within type
(B). While one would intuitively expect type (B) to occur more
frequently in regions where the structural aspect is more
developed, the analysis lends no support for such a conclusion.
Indeed, one could think that, relative to other areas, impunity in
Europe or North America would be more related to functional
aspects than to the lack of accountability structures. The results
of the analysis tend to counter such intuition, as illustrated by
Figure 5.
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Figure 5: Regional Distributionof Type B with Sub-Regions
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Figure 5 shows that North America and Western Europe, as
sub-regions of the Americas and Europe/Central Asia, are not
visibly over-represented in type (B). Given the sample's relatively
small size, 55 it is hard to draw any strong conclusion from the
slight differences present. It is therefore difficult to venture
beyond the general assertion that type (B) is the most frequently
reported form of impunity irrespective of the regional contexts.
That being said, it is possible to dig deeper into the substance of
what has been outlined so far. Indeed, while it might be difficult
to draw detailed conclusions in the aggregate, a qualitative
analysis of the data reviewed can be illuminating in many
respects, particularly regarding regional idiosyncrasies.
Let us start with Africa. Compared to other regions, Africa
has the highest percentage of reports (approximately 22%) located
in the non-state actor dimension. 56 The reports listed under type
(D) concern situations of civil conflict where armed militias of the
opposition have committed gross human rights violations.5 7 This
seems to be a recurrent pattern in Africa and could serve as a
basis for fine-tuning the concept of impunity to the specific

55. See supra app. 1.
56. See supra fig. 2.
57. The relevant reports are identified in Appendix 2 and can be accessed at
AI's online library at http://www.amnesty.org.
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circumstances of the continent. It is important to note that armed
militias in Africa, such as Unido Nacional para a Independ~ncia
Total de Angola ("UNITA") or Revolutionary United Front
("RUF"), have tended to be seen as the paradigmatic illustration of
a non-state actor. 58 In turn, the use of such a characterization
could help explain why there are so few reports falling under this
dimension. As long as the idea of a non-state actor evokes mostly
armed militias, a large array of cases where other kinds of actors
bearing no particular relation to the state escape accountability for
human rights violations may be overlooked. Illustrations of this
idea include the report on Kenya under type (C), which addresses
domestic violence by people for which there is no relevant
legislation, as well as the one on El Salvador under type (D),
which deals with the failure to prosecute a prominent case of
violence against women. 59 A relevant question would be whether
non-state actors' criminality is being overlooked as one substantial
aspect of impunity or whether it is consciously considered as being
60
beyond the boundaries of the concept of impunity.
The public sector in the Americas, in particular the police, is
reported to benefit from impunity. The most widespread impunity
issues on which AI has been focusing in South, Central, and North
America appear to be ill-treatment, torture, and coercion of
prisoners and civilians for which the perpetrators were never duly
prosecuted and/or punished.6 1 Most often this is attributed to the
malfunctioning of the judicial system, which seems intricately
related to the challenges of democratic transition characterizing

58. See infra app. 2.
59. See infra app. 2; see also Amnesty Int'l, Four Years of Impunity: Amnesty
International Declaration on the Case of Katya Miranda, AI Index AMR
29/001/2003, Apr. 4, 2003, available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/
AMR290012003ENGLISH/$File/AMR2900103.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2006);
Amnesty Int'l, Kenya: Violence against women: Women at risk of domestic abuse, AI
Index
AFR
32/002/2002,
Mar.
8,
2002,
available
at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/AFR320022002ENGLISH/$File/AFR3200202
.pdf.
60. Historically, the term "impunity" was used in the context of ordinary
criminality. International crimes and international human rights are a relatively
recent phenomenon. One can trace them roughly back to the end of the Second
World War. The fact that Al or a sector of the international law community has
focused on violations by state actors needs to be revisited. For instance, a
significant portion of gender-related abuses seems to be perpetrated by individuals
with no connection whatsoever with the state apparatus. Such abuses would
normally fall under the category of ordinary criminality, for which a large sector of
the international law community refuses to apply the term impunity. This
exclusion is by no means obvious either idiomatically or technically and should, if
maintained, be explained and made explicit.
61. See generally infra app. 2.
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the region. 62 Approximately 70% of all the reports focusing on the
Americas are indeed located on the functional side, whereas only
30% focus on structural deficiencies; 63 however, most of these
reports address the same problem, the behavior of the security
forces. 64 Regarding non-state actors' impunity, the Americas and
Africa are the only regions represented. 65 Interestingly, the two
reports concerned address the same issues as those raised by the
reports on Africa, namely the misdeeds of armed militias and
66
private violence against women.
Moving to Asia-Pacific, again, the functioning of the
administration of justice is involved in the large majority
(approximately 63%) of the reports. 67 Within this category, two
main patterns can be identified. From the fifteen reports included
in this 63%, ten deal with police abuses and ill-treatment of
prisoners, and five focus more specifically on the repression of
opposition forces. 68 Regarding type (A), the majority of the cases
(four out of seven) concerns governmental restrictions on
69
fundamental rights.
In Europe and Central Asia, although the trend seems to
emphasize the functional aspect of impunity (59%), the structural
aspect is also significantly represented (41%).70 The cleavage
between the functional and structural aspects is apparently less
important in Europe than in Asia. It is hard to draw detailed
conclusions as to the regional concentration within type (B);
however, it is noteworthy that five out of seven Western European
countries are located in type (B). 71 This requires some comment.
First, the conceptual consistency of the heading "Europe and
Central Asia" is far from obvious and raises the question of
62. See generally infra app. 2.
63. The relevant reports are identified in Appendix 2 and can be accessed at
AI's online library at: www.amnesty.org.
64. See generally infra app. 2 (listing all relevant reports under the title
"Americas").
65. See suprafig. 2.
66. See Amnesty Int'l, Columbia: Extrajudicial Killings, "Disappearances"
Death Threats and Other Political Violence in the Department of Sucre, AI Index
AMR 23/030/1996, June 1, 1996, available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/
AMR230301996ENGLISH/$File/AMR2303096.pdf; Amnesty Int'l, Four Years of
Impunity: Amnesty International Declaration on the Case of Katya Miranda, AI
Index AMR 29/001/2003, April 4, 2003, available at http://web.amnesty.org/library
/pdf/AMR290012003ENGLISH/$File/AMR2900103.pdf.
67. See suprafig. 2.
68. See generally infra app. 2.
69. See generally infra app. 2.
70. See suprafig. 2.
71. See supra fig. 2.
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whether such a heading is analytically useful or adequate.7 2
Second, while there is hardly a difference between the distribution
of Western Europe and Central/Eastern Europe across types (A)
and (B) respectively, the data suggests quite clearly that the
structural aspect is relatively more pressing in Central Asia than
in Europe: five reports out of seven are located in type (A).73 In
other words, there appears to be a stronger structural problem in
these countries.
Finally, regarding the Middle East and North Africa,7 4 the
region is relatively under-represented in terms of reporting. Only
seven reports in a sample of ninety-eight focused on the Middle
East. 75 Perhaps this comes from the fact that the 'TMiddle East
and North Africa" as a geographical category is smaller than the
other four regions.7 6 Based on fewer observations, the results of
the analysis must be handled more carefully. Let me note what
appears to be the most salient point with respect to this area,
namely that it is the only area in which the reports are almost
equally distributed between types (A) and type (B), four and three

72. Any aggregation of this sort is inherently subject to controversy. This is, of
course, not the place to discuss the epistemological and theoretical foundations of
"area studies" or the many critiques that have been advanced against the
See
feasibility or usefulness of geographical and/or disciplinary aggregation.
Robert H. Bates, Area Studies and the Discipline: A Useful Controversy?, 30 PS:
POL. SCI. & POL. 166 (1997); Richard D. Lambert, Blurring the Disciplinary
Boundaries:Area Studies in the United States, 33 AM. BEHAV. SCI., 712 (1990). The
point I am trying to make is simply that even assuming area studies are
epistemologically sound, Europe and Central Asia have traditionally been
approached as different (or belonging to different) areas. See M.R. DJALILI & T.
KELLNER, GEOPOLITIQUE DE LA NOUVELLE ASIE CENTRALE: DE LA FIN DE L'URSS A
L'APRES-11 SEPTEMBRE, (Publ'ns of the Univ. Inst. of the High Int'l Studies, ed.,
Univ. Presses of Fr. 2003) (2001) (providing an "area" approach to Central Asia).
73. See infra app. 2.
74. Here, again, one may ask whether the aggregation of these two regions is
adequate. One possible argument that it is somewhat less controversial than the
category "Europe and Central Asia" stems from the large influence of Islam in both
regions, although many other regions could also be included if Islam was the
underlying basis for aggregation. In any case, I use this category here because Al
uses such a categorization.
75. See suprafig. 2.
76. I have not verified the relative share of AI reports on this geographical area
with respect to topics other than impunity. It may be possible that other "themes"
regarding the Middle East and North Africa in Al's library include relatively more
reports than those on impunity, in which case the smaller size of the geographical
region would not provide a helpful explanation. It should be noted that this is by
no means intended to suggest that AI has focused less on the Middle East than on
other regions. As a matter of fact, there seems to be a conscious commitment to
provide information on and to the Middle East, as reflected in the choice to make
Arabic one of the four languages in which documentation is made available.
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reports respectively. 77 Indeed, unlike the other four regional
categories, structural aspects seem to be equally or more pressing
than functional aspects in the Middle East and North Africa. 78
Figure 6 takes up this latter point through a synthesis of the
relative distribution between types (A) and (B) for each region:
Figure 6: Relative Distributionof Each Region between
Types (A) and (B)
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Each area of the circle in Figure 6 represents the ratio of the
number of reports located in type (A) to the number located in type
(B) for each geographical region. Taking the Middle East as an
example, figure 2 shows 4 reports in type (A) and 3 in type (B),
yielding a 1.3 ratio. The basic insight to be derived is that, as
pointed out before, Central Asia and the Middle East/North Africa
present relatively more structural issues than the other regions
reviewed.
This difference constitutes one of the many possible criteria
that could be used to build a quantitative concept of impunity.
Indeed, one could, for instance, assume that where a number of
for
conditions
structural
basic
pre-defined
empirically
accountability are lacking, the country in question could be
considered, for purposes of the fight against impunity, less

77. Supra fig. 2.
78. Supra fig. 2.
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advanced than other countries where such structures are in place.
This type of reasoning could provide the basis for an international
index of impunity to be developed.
III. An International Impunity Index: A Proposal
An obvious preliminary question to any proposal to develop
an international impunity index: why? There are a number of
reasons why this could be a worthwhile undertaking. First, such
an index would provide a snapshot comparative view of the "level"
of impunity in different countries at a given point in time. Second,
it would help focus the attention of human rights organizations in
more organized and targeted ways.
Indeed, by providing a
thorough empirical understanding of how this issue is being
handled in practice, human rights organizations could adjust their
focus on their intended policies. Third, it could add considerable
leverage to the work of human rights organizations by making the
impunity phenomenon in a particular country more ascertainable.
Fourth, it also would allow countries that are truly committed to
fighting impunity to show that they are obtaining concrete results.
Fifth, such an index would additionally represent a very useful
tool for human rights organizations to raise funds for their
activities, since it would help assess their concrete impact in a way
more easily understandable to donors. Sixth, and more generally,
it could serve to accumulate disparate but precious information on
impunity issues that may otherwise be extremely hard to
aggregate in a meaningful and systematic way. There are, of
course, many challenges involved in such an undertaking. In
order to better identify these challenges, it is first necessary to
discuss another question: how?
Suppose we focus exclusively on one of the four types of the
impunity framework and try to establish a typology of the main
categories of issues it covers so that most reports can be located
into one of these categories. Such a methodology would follow the
same logic as the one leading to the overall framework in the first
place, but with respect to one single type. For instance, if we focus
on types (A) and (C), 7 9 among the sub-categories that would take
us closer to the structural conditions of the impunity phenomenon,
one could mention the following: the non-ratification of certain
treaties dealing with human rights; humanitarian law and
international accountability mechanisms; the existence of amnesty
laws or other similar statutes preventing prosecution; structural

79. See supra fig. 1.
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obstacles to transparency such as state ownership of mass media;
structural lack of protection of witnesses, lawyers, prosecutors,
and judges; lack of victim compensation mechanisms; etc. One
could go even further and display more detailed, and therefore
numerous, sub-categories. Of course, the closer we get to reality,
the harder it will be to keep an overall conceptual view. There is
no point in building a city map as large and detailed as the city
itself; however, I think that finding a satisfactory compromise
between conceptual and empirical considerations is far less
unrealistic than what is usually assumed. This can be explained
more clearly once the purpose of such sub-categories is understood.
The main function of sub-categories is to serve as criteria for
a "questionnaire" reflecting the impunity profile of a particular
country at a given time. Suppose that somewhere between twenty
and thirty sub-categories are identified, and all four main types
These sub-categories would become the criteria
considered.
against which to compare the data we have on a particular
country. Such data could be derived from a number of human
rights organizations and bodies that periodically report on issues
related to impunity and would be constantly updated as the
organizations issue new data. In practice, this would mean that
for each country we would have a profile broken down into a set of
items to which a specific weight will be assigned. This latter point
is particularly delicate. In order to move from a qualitative notion
to a quantitative one, it is necessary to assign values to each
criterion, values on the basis of which the situation in a country
can be weighted. A simple example would be asking whether the
country ratified the U.N. Convention Against Torture.8 0 The
country would receive a different number of points according to
the answer. A less straightforward criterion would be the number
of police ill-treatment allegations or of extra-judicial executions.
In such cases, a scale of answers could be introduced, with each
value of the scale representing a different number of points. A
function would then integrate the points for each criterion,
yielding a result reflecting the level of impunity in a particular
country at a given time. The normative weighting could either be
included in the number of points allocated to each value for each
criterion or be performed (at least partly) by this function, for

80. This same criterion could of course be presented in a wide array of forms
from the very general "Has the country ratified the, most important human
rights/humanitarian treaties?" to a more precise "Has the country signed the U.N.
Convention against torture? Has it ratified it? Has it taken any steps to make its
provisions fully operational within the system?"
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instance, by adjusting the counting whenever two criteria related
in their substance are both met.
Admittedly, the main problem would not be the math, but
rather this very normative weighting. Indeed, such weighting
could introduce a large amount of arbitrariness into the whole
measure, thereby fundamentally undermining the credibility of
the proposal. This was what I had in mind when I mentioned the
daunting challenges that the proposal faces at the beginning of
this section.
Is there any way around such a difficulty?
Obviously, there is no perfect way to perform such weighting, but
this does not mean that a sensible and intuitive weighting is out of
reach. Most indices reflecting normative ideas, such as the U.N.'s
Human Development Index,81 to name but one famous example,
are confronted with this problem. The basic answer is to keep in
mind the normative choices underlying the weighting when
interpreting the index. But one could go further. For instance, it
may be possible to subject the specific weighting to a process of
consultation with actors such as NGOs, intergovernmental
organizations, and governments. This process should be public
and as transparent as possible in order for parties to participate
constructively, contributing only those views they judge morally
82
acceptable enough to be expressed in public.
This is not the only difficulty that would arise, as there are
many other challenges that must be taken into account. The
information gathering and selection procedure raises several
difficult questions, including that of the sources of such
information,83 the updating mechanism, and the biases that may
result from an imbalance in the coverage of different countries.
One should also consider the political and diplomatic externalities

81. See U.N. Development Programme, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 88-101
(Oxford Univ. Press) (1991).
82. The model would come close to the idea of a reasonable debate in the line of
the German philosopher JUrgen Habermas.
See, e.g., J. Habermas,
ERLAUTERUNGEN ZUR DISKURSETHIK (Suhrkamp Verlag 1991), translated in
JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATION: REMARKS ON DISCOURSE ETHICS (Ciaran Cronin

trans., The MIT Press 1993).
83. A basic problem concerns the reliability of governmental sources of
information. This could be dealt with in many ways. For instance, one way would
be simply to "discount" the value of governmental information by a given factor
(such a factor could be fixed or dynamic, and dependent upon the performance of
other variables such as freedom of speech and press). Another way would be to rely
on data gathered by independent NGOs that issue reports based on direct factual
observation, as opposed to information released by governments. Large NGOs such
as AI and Human Rights Watch, as well as more narrowly focused organizations
such as Transparency International or TRIAL, could provide much of the
information required to develop the index.
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of participating in such an enterprise. Some states may modify
their attitude toward participating organizations that, until that
point, were having a positive impact on human rights issues due
precisely to either cooperation or indifference from the government
concerned.
These challenges should not be underestimated, but it may
be equally detrimental to overestimate them. If the term impunity
is to move beyond the status of an extremely vague category,
subject both to abuse and, most importantly, to dilution in the
verbal cacophony often surrounding international fora, an
empirical concept of impunity may become a very useful tool,
complementary to the efforts so far conducted by scholars, NGOs,
and intergovernmental organizations to define impunity from a
qualitative perspective.
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Appendix 1: A Note on Methodology
The sample, consisting of ninety-eight reports, was extracted
from a total of slightly more than 1,000 reports selected out of
3,000 documents catalogued under the rubric "impunity" in AI's
public online library (covering documents from 1992 on).8 4 We
randomly selected 12% of the overall number of reports
corresponding to each of the five geographical areas used by AI (as
of January 2005), which yielded the following number of reports
per area: nineteen for Africa, twenty-two for the Americas, twentyone for Asia-Pacific, twenty-nine for Europe and Central Asia,
seven for the Middle East and North Africa. We then proceeded to
do an intuitive check to make sure that the countries most
frequently covered in the reports were represented accordingly in
the sample. The reports were analyzed by separate groups
focusing on specific regions, whose task was to derive a number of
dimensions of impunity that would make sense of the cases
reviewed. These dimensions were then discussed and merged,
yielding the overall impunity framework discussed above. The
next step was to place each report into the framework according to
a common set of guidelines. Whenever the substance of the report
fit unambiguously into one of the four types, the report appeared
only in that type. Reports addressing both state and non-state
actors were placed in both sectors, provided that both played a
roughly equal role in the report (which means that more than the
original ninety-eight reports appear in the corresponding
exhibits).8 5 In cases where states had adopted the instruments of
international law but had not taken the necessary steps to
implement them in their national legal system, the problem was
dealt with in the following manner: whenever there were
institutional obstacles (either the absence of an implementation
law or decree, or the existence of a legal instrument impeding the
implementation of the treaty) the report was listed under type (A)
or (C), namely the structural aspect. On the contrary, when the
legal structure was in itself sufficient but the treaty was not
actually being implemented (because of lack of will or incapacity),
the report was placed under the functional aspect in types (B) or
(D). In cases where these facts could not be established precisely,
the decision was taken upon the analysis of the indicators for one
84. See AI's online library, available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/
engindex (last visited July 29, 2006).
85. The number of reports placed in two types are follows: four for Africa, five
for the Americas, two for Asia-Pacific, none for the other two regions.
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